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THE ROLE OF HEARSAY IN A RATIONAL SCHEME
OF EVIDENCE
George F. James*
ARLY in the nineteenth centuryJeremy Bentham directed his
considerable analytical powers
toward the common law rules of evi-
dence to discover to what extent they
were adapted to their apparent purpose
-the discovery of truth. His conclusion
was bitter,
"That the system, taken in the aggre-
gate, is repugnant to the ends of justice;
and that this is true of almost every
rule that has ever been laid down on
the subject of evidence.'
This reaction is almost the inevitable re-
sult of what Bentham described as the
"theorem" of his treatise:
"The theorem is this: that, merely
with a view to rectitude of decision, to
the avoidance of the mischiefs attached
to undue decision, no species of evi-
dence whatsoever, willing or unwilling,
ought to be excluded: for that although
in certain cases it may be right that this
or that lot of evidence, though tendered,
should not be admitted, yet, in these
cases, the reason for the exclusion rests
on other grounds; viz. avoidance of
vexation, expense, and delay."2
Bentham's analysis produced results
both practical and theoretical. For the
former, the half century after his death
saw the abolition of many of the dis-
* Ph.B. 1930, J. D. 1932, University of Chicago;
LLM. 1934, Columbia; Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Chicago Law School.
IBentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence
(Hunt and Clarke, London, 1827) 21.
2 Id., at 1. The writer has heard Professor
M. J. Adler express the same view:-that all
exclusionary rules rest, so far as they are sound
qualifications of witnesses against which
he had directed some of his most viru-
lent attacks. For the latter, Thayer's
point of view, and directly or through
Thayer the spirit of Wigmore's treatise,
owe much to Bentham's works. How- -
ever, neither Thayer nor Wigmore
adopted Bentham's attitude of whole-
sale enmity toward the rules of evi-
dence. Thus, Thayer, although he sug-
gests as a "main rule" of evidence "that
whatsoever is relevant is admissible,
3 '
elsewhere states with reference to our
voluminous and complex system of ex-
clusionary rules:
"The few principles which underlie
this elaborate mass of matter are clear,
simple, and sound." 4
Similarly Wigmore, though sharply crit-
ical in many particulars, has written:
"... the present rules as a whole are
sensible ones. Taking each of them in
the big, there is hardly one that is not
based on some aspect of human nature,
which needs some such a rule of
warning."
5
At the extreme of admiration we find
Greenleaf, who writes at the close of
his first volume on Evidence:
"Having thus completed the original
design of this volume, in a view of the
at all, ultimately on the necessity that trials
must be concluded within limited time.
sThayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence
at the Common Law (Little, Brown, and Com-
pany, 1898) 523.
4 Id., at 511.
5Wigmore, Evidence (Little, Brown, and
Company, 1923) 127.
[788]
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Principles and Rules of the Law of
Evidence, understood to be common to
all the United States, this part of the
work is here properly brought to a
close. The student will not fail to ob-
serve the symmetry and beauty of this
branch of the law, under whatever dis-
advantages it may labor, from the man-
ner of treatment; and will rise from
the study of its principles convinced,
with Lord Erskine, that 'they are
founded in the charities of religion,-
in the philosophy of nature,---in the
truths of history,--and in the experi-
ence of common life'."6
So thoroughly had the arguments for
and against most of the exclusionary
rules been analyzed and evaluated by
earlier writers that in 1922, when the
Commonwealth Fund supported a crit-
ical investigation of the law of evidence
by a committee of most of the distin-
guished living authorities, under the
chairmanship of Professor Morgan, the
committee decided not to discuss the
entire field or to re-examine a priori
arguments, but to confine itself to an
empirical examination of such specific
reforms as were susceptible of this
treatment. This decision was placed
upon three grounds: that the rules of
evidence were "sound on the whole,"
that only a few could be subjected to
empirical tests, and that only piecemeal
and specific changes could possibly be
obtained anyhow. Subsequent experi-
ence has shown that even piecemeal
and specific changes are not easily ob-
6Greenleaf, Evidence (Sixteenth Edition, by
J. H. Wigmore, Little, Brown, and Company,
1899) §534. The same passage also is found at
the close of each edition of Taylor on Evidence,
a leading English work based upon Greenleaf.
71Morgan et al, The Law of Evidence (Yale
University Press, 1927) xlff.
8 Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and
Forward at Evidence (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909.
9 Wigmore, Evidence 127.
1o Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louis-
tained in courts of law or from the
legislatures.8
But since the nineteen twenties a
major development 'in the law justifies
a complete reappraisal of the law of
evidence. While administrative boards
were by no means unknown prior to
the market crash of '29, in the past
decade their tremendous rise in prac-
tical importance is the outstanding fea-
ture of the field of procedure. One im-
portant consequence is that there is now
a great body of litigation of utmost im-
portance, involving frequent appeals to
the courts, in which the existing evi-
dential precedents, "the petty details
and infinitestimal absurdities with
which the rules of evidence have been
elaborated" are not binding.
Indeed, certain of the statutes grant-
ing quasi-judicial powers to administra-
tive boards appears to provide for hear-
ings characterized by completely "free
proof." However, they have not been so
construed. The freedom of investiga-
tion is commonly held to be limited by
a somewhat vague principle expressed
in a leading case as follows:
"But the more liberal the practice in
admitting testimony, the more impera-
tive the obligation to preserve the
essential rules of evidence by which
rights are asserted or defended."'01
With this criterion to apply, how then
do we determine which are the "essen-
tial rules"? Clearly judicial precedents
ville & Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93
(1913). Perhaps even more suggestive is the
phraseology of Judge Hough in John Bene &
Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 468,
471 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924): "We are of opinion that
evidence or testimony, even though legally in-
competent, if of the kind that usually affects
fair minded men in the conduct of their daily
and more important affairs, should be received
and considered; but it should be fairly done."
(Italics supplied.)
1940]
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will not prove particularly helpful.
Practical experience might be the best
criterion for selecting "essential" rules
of evidence but for the fact that on most
problems such experience is wholly
lacking. There are usually no compara-
ble bodies of data obtained or obtain-
able under existing rules and under a
system operating without these rules.
In most cases the only possible solution
must be sought in a priori argument.
It is hoped that this paper may shed
some light upon one corner of the field
of evidence, and that it may even sug-
gest an approach toward the entire
subject.
II
Let us start where Thayer started,
with the proposition "that whatsoever
is relevant is admissable" unless sound
cause can be shown for its exclusion.
Here the term "relevant" is itself some-
what ambiguous. As Michael and Adler
have argued, the word can hardly be
given a strict logical meaning.11 As a
matter of logic an item of evidence is
relevant to a desired conclusion only in
terms of some (usually unexpressed)
generality connecting the two. It is al-
ways possible to imagine a general
proposition which can form the logical
nexus between the evidence and the
conclusion. On the assertion of such a
general proposition any logical difficulty
vanishes. The only remaining problem
is whether the trier of fact will accept
the suggested generalization as suffi-
ciently probable to make the line of
13 Lichael and Adler, The Trial of an Issue
of Fact (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1224, 1462.
12 Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence
(MacMillan and Company, 1876) c. IV.
13 The reference is to a remark made in con-
proof persuasive, the probability of the
generalization being determined by
expert evidence or by the practical
knowledge of the court. Formal logic
cannot determine such a question. On
the other hand, rules of law and that
most extraordinary concept, "legal rele-
vance," are even less helpful. One need
only examine Sir James Stephen's irri-
tating treatment of hearsay as "rele-
vant" and "irrelevant"1 2 to develop a
strong aversion to any discussion of
relevance which seeks to include pure-
ly legal criteria. The solution is ap-
parently to regard relevance in foren-
sic proof neither as a lawyer's nor as
a logician's but as an ordinary man's
concept, depending on whether the or-
dinary man, in making decisions in his
own affairs, would regard the offered
evidence as having some tendency to
increase the apparent probability of the
proposition sought to be proved. Al-
though on its face such a test may
seem unduly vague, it should present
no difficult problems in application. To
quote Professor Adler again, offers of
truly irrelevant evidence are almost
unknown. They will occur, rarely, as
part of a line of proof known by the
advocate to contain a concealed fallacy,
and sometimes as the result of mere
carelessness or mistake.-s
The next inquiry relates to the possi-
ble grounds for excluding relevant
proof. In the writer's opinion, there
are only four.' 4 (a) Evidence may be
excluded because, although relevant,
its probative force is too slight to justify
versation; Professor Adler may have taken the
same position in print.
14 Rules based on policies extraneous to the
problems of proof, such as the attorney-client
privilege, are left out of account.
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the time and expense to be spent in
receiving it.15 (b) It may be rejected
because, although it has substantial
probative value, it also has such a ten-
dency to prejudice or to confuse that its
use would probably do more harm than
good.'( (Some might extend this prin-
ciple to exclude possibly misleading
evidence which the trier of fact is
deemed incapable of evaluating prop-
erly, lest it be given undue weight.)
(c) It may be excluded because it may
be false, and because the opposite party
could not be prepared to meet and re-
but it. 17  (d) Evidence may be ex-
cluded because it is inferior to other
evidence which could have been pro-
duced, so that the non-production of
the better creates a suspicion concern-
ing the worse.'
Turning at long last to the subject of
hearsay, it can be and indeed has been
argued that hearsay, or most hearsay,
is excluded because it is irrelevant.' 9
Little thought is required to see that if
irrelevant means having no tendency
to increase the apparent probability of
the proposition sought to be proved,
hearsay is neither relevant nor irrele-
vant, but, like any other species of evi-
dence, sometimes relevant and some-
times irrelevant. The point has been
established so long that it need not be
labored.2 0 Irrelevance, used as a basis
for the general exclusion of hearsay,
must mean "legal irrelevance." This
15 As in the collateral issue rule, where rightly
applied.
16 An example is the rule excluding proof of
a criminal defendant's prior conviction of an
infamous crime.
17 The rule excluding proof of bad character
by evidence of particular wicked acts, not
pleaded, illustrates this principle.
18 The familiar best evidence rule, requiring
documentary originals where available.
argument is question-begging, and may
be vicious in its consequences.
Many cases give as a reason for the
rule excluding hearsay the often-quoted
statement of Chief Justice Marshall:
"'Hearsay' evidence is in its own
nature inadmissible. That this species
of testimony supposes some better tes-
timony which might be adduced in the
particular case, is not the sole ground
of its exclusion. Its inherent weakness,
its incompetency to satisfy the mind of
the existence of the fact, and the frauds
which might be practiced under its
cover, combine to support the rule that
hearsay evidence is totally inadmis-
sible." 21
In part this dictum supports the "bet-
ter evidence" theory, considered below.
But in part it suggests as a reason for
its exclusion that the probative force
of hearsay is too slight to justify giv-
ing it time at trial.
At an early date the "inherent weak-
ness" of hearsay was regarded as
springing primarily from the lack of
an oath.22 When the modern witness
had but recently appeared upon the
scene of litigation, when the trial by
compurgation of an earlier day was
still, in theory at least, part of the legal
system and when the spiritual sanc-
tion may have been more effective than
today it was reasonable to attach con-
siderable importance to the ceremony
of swearing. As a consequence, it be-
came settled first that hearsay, stand-
ing alone, was not sufficient evidence
of a material fact and later that it
'9 Stephen, op. cit. supra, note 12.
2o Starkie on Evidence (3. & W. T. Clarke,
1824) §XxvI.
23 Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U. S.
290, 295 (7 Cranch, 1813).
22 Phipson on Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell,
Limited, 1930) 217, and cases cited; See also
Gilbert on Evidence (2d. Ed., London, 1760) 152
for a contemporary view.
1940]
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should not be received at all.23 Today,
and indeed for at least a century,2 the
importance of the oath has suffered a
sharp decline in common estimate; in
its place the lack of cross-examination
is cited as the basis for hearsay exclu-
sion. This shift in emphasis appeared
in judicial opinion early in the eigh-
teenth century;25 today the most au-
thoritative writer declares the lack of
cross-examination to be the essential
defect in hearsay testimony. Now it
may be true that unsworn declarations
are less reliable than testimony given
under oath. And it may be true that
cross-examination is an extremely use-
ful check on faulty memory or wilful
deceit. Neither of these propositions
justifies the general exclusion of hear-
say. To justify general exclusion on
the ground of "inherent weakness" one
must say that all hearsay is so utterly
unreliable that in no case does its value
justify the time and expense attendant
on its use.
This raises the question of the basic
testimonial hypothesis. Do we believe,
with the hasty David, that all men are
liars? Then it is reasonable to exclude
all men's testimony unless it be given
in view of the trier of fact, under the
danger of criminal penalties and in the
fear of hell-fire, and subject to the
searching test of cross-examination. In-
deed, the depravity of man was once so
fully accepted that even under these
conditions interested parties were
spared the temptation to perjury. To-
2s Phipson on Evidence, 217, and cases cited;
Wigmor, Evidence, §1364, tracing the develop-
ment at length.
24 See Bentham's attack on the oath as a guar-
anty of veracity in his Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, 1827.
25 Phipson gives 1716 as the year "when the
day the law takes a more optimistic
view of human nature. Few, it is sub-
mitted, really believe that all men are
liars. In most cases people tell the truth
as they see it, and although their per-
ception, understanding and recollection
may be subject to error, this possibil-
ity of error is not so high as to bring
the average of truth in all ordinary
out-of-court statements of fact down as
low as or even very nearly as low as
fifty per cent. If this be true, general
exclusion of hearsay cannot be justified
on its lack of substantial evidentiary
value.
Starkie, a most discriminating writer,
discussed this difficulty without being
able to suggest a satisfactory explana-
tion for the generally accepted rules.
After pointing out the weakness of
hearsay as compared with testimony
based upon the speaker's own knowl-
edge, he continued,
"but, it may be asked, since evidence
of the declaration of a person whose
veracity is unimpeached would have
some tendency to convince the mind,
where the fact disputed is otherwise
doubtful, why is not such evidence at
least admissible, leaving its effect to be
considered by the proper tribunal. To
take a strong case: suppose that A., a
person of undoubted credit, had asserted
that he saw B. inflict a mortal wound
upon C., a party who knew A. to be a
man of the strictest veracity, and who
was also convinced that he had gravely
made that assertion, would necessarily
attach some degree of credit to it, and
its effect might be to turn the scale, and
to create in his mind a conviction of the
truth of the fact of which he might
exclusion of hearsay is apparently for the first
time put, not alone upon the old ground that
the original speaker was not upon oath, but also
upon the more modem one, that the other side
had no opportunity for cross-examination (2
Hawkins, P1. Cr. 596-7)." See also Wigmore,
Evidence §1364.
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otherwise have doubted. In such a case
therefore, if A. be dead, and B. be
charged with the death of C., why
should not the declaration of A. be
admitted in evidence? It may be an-
swered, that the law must proceed by
general and by certain rules. If, there-
fore, the mere declaration of A. in this
case were to be admitted, it would
follow that the declaration of every
other person, with respect to every
other disputed fact, would also be ad-
missible. The consequence would be to
let in numberless wanton, careless, and
unfounded assertions, unworthy of the
least regard. The principle would
extend to all the loose, idle, and con-
tradictory conversation that had taken
place upon the subject in dispute, to
none of which any degree of credit
could safely be attached; and, above
all, the evidence would be wholly un-
supported by those tests of truth which
the law in general requires; it would
not rest upon the obligation of an oath;
there would be no certainty, either as
to the means of knowledge, or as to the
faithful transmission by the asserting
party of that which he knew. Another
reason for the rejection of such evi-
dence arises from the nature and con-
stitution of the tribunal whose minds
are to be convinced. If it were to be
assumed, that one who had long enured
to judicial habits might be able to assign
to such evidence just so much, and no
greater credit than it deserved, yet,
upon the minds of a jury unskilled in
the nature of judicial proofs, evidence
of this kind would frequently make an
erroneous impression. Being accus-
tomed, in the common concerns of life,
to act upon hearsay and report, they
would naturally be inclined to give such
credit when acting judicially; they
would be unable to reduce such evi-
dence to its proper standard, when
placed in competition with more certain
and satisfactory evidence; they would,
in consequence of their previous habits,
be apt to forget how little reliance ought
to be placed upon evidence which may
so easily and securely be fabricated;
26 Starkie on Evidence 44-46.
their minds would be confused and em-
barrassed by a mass of conflicting tes-
timony; and they would be liable to
be prejudiced and biassed by the char-
acter of the person from whom the
evidence was derived. In addition to
this, since everything would depend
upon the character of the party who
made the assertion, and the means of
knowledge which he possessed, the
evidence, if admitted, would require
support from proof of the character and
respectability of the asserting party;
and every question might branch out
into an indefinite number of collateral
issues.
Upon these grounds it is that the
mere recital of a fact, that is, the mere
oral assertion, or written entry by an
individual, that a particular fact is true,
cannot be received in evidence." 26
Thus Starkie raises the problem, but
the keystone in his answer is faulty.
"If, therefore, the mere declaration of
A in this case were to be admitted, it
would follow, that the declaration of
every other person, with respect to
every other disputed fact, would also
be admissible." Why? Because "the
law must proceed by general and by
certain rules." Such a contention is
contrary to elementary observation.
Starkie himself, after basing the gen-
eral exclusion of hearsay on the ground
that much hearsay is unworthy of the
least regard and that therefore all hear-
say must be excluded so that the law
may proceed by general and by certain
rules, goes on for some thirty pages to
discuss exceptions to the rule and spe-
cial situations in which it is not applic-
able. In Wigmore's more careful and
exhaustive treatise the full flower of
the generality and certainty of the nine-
teenth century rules of evidence stands
revealed: a principle of hearsay exclu-
1940]
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sion uncertain in scope and subject to
fourteen arbitrary and ill-defined ex-
ceptions, seldom well understood by
advocate or judge.27 If this is what
courts really do, the judicial rules of
exclusion can hardly be sustained by
the principle of certainty and general-
ity invoked by Starkie. Nor does the
principle fare better when considered
as part of an ideal system. The most
such a principle can require is that
similar cases be decided alike, by
known and inflexible rules; it cannot
give the criteria of similarity in cases.
It would be as reasonable to insist that
generality and certainty require all kill-
ings to be punished as murder or all
promises to be enforced as contracts
as on this basis to require that all hear-
say be excluded as untrustworthy. If
some hearsay has, and other hearsay
lacks adequate reliability, the question
should be, "What criteria can we use
to divide the good from the bad?"
Once the possibility of rejecting some
offers of hearsay and accepting others
is recognized, Starkie's arguments oper-
ate at most to exclude some hearsay on
the basis of the second possible ground
suggested above-that some hearsay is
too prejudicial, or too confusing, or too
difficult to evaluate to justify its use.
As for any strictly prejudicial effect,
hearsay appears to stand upon the same
basis as any other evidence. It may or
may not be unduly prejudicial. If it is,
27 A rule more general and certain than the
present hearsay exceptions has been suggested,
which would accommodate Mr. Starkie's "strong
case." See Morgan et al, the Law of Evidence,
c. IV.
28 Bentham's remarks on this point in con-
nection with the use of "second degree hearsay"
are still appropriate:
"transmitted evidence purporting to have
passed through more media than one, may still
be received, whatsoever be the number of such
it should be excluded for the same rea-
son and under the same circumstances
as other testimony. For example, if it
is objectionable to prove the bad char-
acter of a criminal defendant, such evi-
dence should be excluded whether it
is in the hearsay form of general bad
reputation or in the form of prior con-
victions for infamous crimes.
The contention that hearsay - or
some hearsay - cannot properly be
evaluated by a common law jury seems
highly questionable to this writer.
Starkie suggests that jurors, because
accustomed to relying on hearsay in
the common concerns of life, would be
unable to reduce such evidence to its
proper standard when placed in com-
petition with more certain and satisfac-
tory evidence. It seems more likely
that this comparative evaluation of
hearsay as against direct evidence is
one of the things all persons do in their
common concerns. The weakness of
rumor, the possibility of error in repe-
tition and the likelihood that persons
subjected to no effective check will lie
in their own interest are matters of
common observation. Granting that
judges hear more evidence and parti-
cipate in the decision of more doubtful
questions of fact than do members of
the general public, all persons do it
more or less, and it is in no sense pecu-
liarly a judicial technique.2
But if one were to grant that the
media: to wit, in every case in which make-
shift evidence transmitted through no more
than one medium would be received; always
under the same conditions and restrictions....
The main and most striking reason is, that,
by the alleged increase in the number of the
media, no new facility is given to fraud. On
the contrary, it can never answer the pur-
poses of fraud, it would be unfavourable to
the purposes of fraud, falsely, or even truly,
to represent any such increase. That assur-
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common law jury should not be trusted
with any but the most reliable hearsay
-such as the statements of an identi-
fied declarant having no motive to de-
ceive-the point is not strictly relevant
to the present subject. The ground for
exclusion, the supposed incapacity of
the ignorant and unskilled juror to deal
with testimony of varying probative
value, should have no application to
the commissioner or trial examiner, a
professional hearer of disputes like the
common law judge and unlike the com-
mon law judge a specialist in a partic-
ular field. We cannot deduce from the
traditional stupidity of the juror one
of the "essential rules of evidence" to
bind an expert fact finding body.
The third possible ground suggested
for the exclusion of relevant evidence
was that some evidence is so difficult to
meet and rebut that its use is unfair.
A specific illustration, perhaps the only
one commonly encountered in practice,
is the rule excluding proof of bad char-
acter by evidence of specific bad acts.
Were the rule otherwise a damaging
collateral issue could be raised at trial,
which the pleadings would in no way
have suggested. It would be almost im-
possible to prepare in advance to repel
such an attack, whether it was wholly
ance of correctness cannot but be diminished
in proportion to the number of media the
evidence has passed through, is a truth, the
force of which cannot but be felt by every
mind to which it is presented. But a man
actuated by fraud, intending deception, to be
brought about by mendacity, will of course
give to the information the most plausible,
the most trustworthy, form, of which it is
susceptible: he will never spontaneously and
unnecessarily multiply causes of untrust-
worthiness and distrust in regard to it. The
danger of fraud (i.e. of deception by fraud)
not being increased by the number of sup-
posed media; there remains the danger of
incorrectness, i.e. of deception by incorrect-
ness. But in this case, in whatsoever propor-
fabricated or based upon distortion of
an actual occurrence. On the other
hand, while there may be some prac-
tical difficulty in defending against a
case based in part or wholly on the re-
peated statements of persons not avail-
able for cross-examination, this is a
difficulty of another order. The issues
to be tried are not concealed as a result
of the admission of such testimony, and
unless a case or defense has been fab-
ricated with extraordinary skill other
evidence will be available to rebut un-
sound conclusions, whether based upon
intentional falsity or upon error or in-
completeness, arising from the repeti-
tion in court of statements not sub-
jected to cross-examination. 29  While
the point that hearsay is always diffi-
cult to meet is perhaps the strongest
one which can be made in support of
general exclusion, in the writer's opin-
ion it falls a trifle short of carrying con-
viction.
Of the possible grounds originally
enumerated for the exclusion of evi-
dence there remains only the principle
of the "best evidence." Although to-
day its operation is virtually restricted
to a preference for the use of the orig-
inal in the proof of the contents of a
document, it was once treated as a rule
tion the danger of incorrectness may be thus
increased, the danger of deception does not
increase with it: for, whatsoever be the dan-
ger of incorrectness, it is apparent to every
eye, upon the very face of the evidence:
apparent to all eyes alike, and in no danger
at all of being set down at any value below
its real value.... 4 Bentham, op. cit. supra,
note 1, at c. X. And see to the same effect
the letter of a Boston lawyer quoted in
Morgan, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 44.
29 It should be noted that today hearsay is
sometimes admitted because there can be no
other proof of the fact in issue, thus aggravat-
ing the danger that this evidence may be false
and proof against effective rebuttal.
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of great importance-one of the first
principles of evidence. Thus Sir Geof-
frey Gilbert's treatise, first published
in 1754, states:
"The first therefore and most signal
Rule, in Relation to Evidence, is this,
that a man must have the utmost
Evidence, the Nature of the Fact is
capable of: For the Design of the Law
is to come to rigid Demonstration in
Matters of Right, and there can be no
Demonstration of a Fact without the
best Evidence that the Nature of the
Thing is capable of; less Evidence doth
create but Opinion and Surmise, and
does not leave a Man the entire Satis-
faction, that arises from Demonstration;
for if it be plainly seen in the Nature
of the Transaction, that there is some
more Evidence that doth not appear, the
very not producing it is a Presumption,
that it would have detected something
more than appears already, and there-
fore the Mind does not acquiesce in any
thing lower than the utmost Evidence
the Fact is capable of."30
This best evidence principle was at
the very least one of the basic elements
in the early development of the rule of
hearsay exclusion.3 ' Even after the rule
had congealed into approximately its
30 The Law of Evidence, by a late Learned
Judge (Gilbert, C. B.) (London).
31 "The true historical nature of this rule
(of hearsay exclusion) is hinted by the remark
of an English court, two centuries ago and
over, when they checked the attempt of a
woman to testify what another woman had told
her. 'The Court' it was quietly remarked, 'are
of the opinion that it will be proper for Wells
to give her own evidence'."
Thayer, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 518.
The full passage reads as follows:
"Do you know whether Mrs. Wells keeps
any cattle?-She keeps a horse and a hog.
How long have you known her?-I have
known her almost forty years; ever since I
can remember.
With what did she use to feed her horse?
-I have seen them fetch grains; and I know
she bought hay, for I saw it brought in, and
by the badness of the weather it was spoiled.
When was it brought it?-In the seasonable
time of hay-making, before last Christmas
was twelve-month.
Where did she put it?-As she said then,
she put it into the room called the shop.
present form the best evidence notion
still appeared as a partial or complete
justification. Thus Starkie, while treat-
ing hearsay as a distinct head, also gave
as an illustration of the best evidence
rule that
"no declaration or entry by any person
can be given in evidence where the
party who made such declaration or
entry can be produced and examined as
a witness.'
2
And Greenleaf, the standard nineteenth
century authority, quotes Chief Justice
Marshall 3 in giving as one basis for
the rule that
"this species of testimony supposes
something better, which might be ad-
duced in the principal case...
The difficulty with this treatment of
hearsay as received and excluded in
courts of common law is obvious. In
other situations secondary evidence is
regularly admitted where the "best
evidence" is unavailable. Yet the law
does not freely permit proof of the dec-
laration even of deceased persons, to
say nothing of persons whose testimony
is unavailable for less conclusive rea-
Mr. Nares. I object against that, as legal
evidence.
Mr. Davy. I am not asking anything Mrs.
Wells said since 1752, but what she said
before, when it was impossible for her to
know of this affair, when it could serve no
purpose to speak falsely; that is evidence.
Mr. Nares. There is one plain rule as to
the evidence of hearsay; that is, that when
you can have that very person that proves
this very fact she is the person to be called;
this is not evidence at all.
Court. The Court are of opinion that it
will be proper for Wells to give her own
evidence...."
Trial of Elizabeth Canning, 19 How. St. Tr.
283, 406 (1754). This form of ruling excluding
hearsay was common. See, e.g., Pickering v.
Barkley, Vin. Abr. "Evidence" p. 6, 1, vol. xll,
175 (1673); Ireland's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 79,
105 (1678); Busby's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 525,
545 (1681).
s2Starkie on Evidence, 390.
33 In Mma Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U. S. 290,
295 (7 Cranch 1813).
34 Greenleaf, Evidence §98.
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sons. As early as the seventeenth cen-
tury declarations of persons since de-
ceased were generally excluded 5
Greenleaf attempted explanation by
the statement:
"Hearsay evidence is uniformly held
incompetent to establish any specific
fact, which, in its nature, is susceptible
of being proved by witnesses who can
speak from their own knowledge."36
With all respect to a prolific and in-
fluential, if none too thoughtful, writer,
this explanation fails to explain. The
proper criterion, the criterion applied
in all other applications of the best evi-
dence rule, is not the best evidence
which, in the nature of the fact to be
proved, could ordinarily be offered to
prove it. It is the best evidence which,
under the circumstances of the case at
bar, this particular litigant could be ex-
pected to present. If the "best evi-
dence" theory for the exclusion of hear-
say is accepted, and it is submitted that
in cases before expert fact finding
bodies there is no other satisfactory
theory,37 some hearsay rule may be jus-
tified as one of the "essential rules of
evidence," but decidedly not the pres-
ently existing rule.
HI.
It remains only to consider the extent
to which the exclusion of hearsay is jus-
tified by the principle here advocated,
and in this connection a brief recapitu-
lation of the principle itself may be jus-
tified. It may be cast in two somewhat
different, but by no means wholly dis-
35 See cases collected in Wigmore, Evidence,
§1364.
36 Greenleaf, Evidence, §98. (Italics supplied.)
37 The writer wishes here to reiterate that
in his personal opinion the conclusions of this
paper are equally valid for jury trials.
38 This approach of course assumes that liti-
tinct, forms. First, as Starkie suggests,
there is something quite suspicious
about one who offers a purported copy
of a document in evidence when the
original is available to him; one may
fairly wonder whether the copy is a
true and perfect one. Similarly, one
cannot but wonder, no cause being
stated, whether a litigant who prefers
quoting a material witness to calling
him does not do so out of desire to
avoid full disclosure. Or, to present
substantially the same idea in a slightly
different form and without pointing the
finger of accusation, it may be said that
every judicial body worthy of the name
is interested in reaching a sound deci-
sion based on understanding of the ac-
tual facts in issue.38 Having this point of
view, a tribunal would naturally insist
on being allowed to hear and to see the
most cogent and reliable evidence avail-
able. There is nothing in either view
to support the exclusion of hearsay ex-
cept when no satisfactory reason ap-
pears for use of the repeated declara-
tion instead of the personally presented
testimony of the declarant.
Application of this principle would
result in admission of hearsay more
freely than under the unanimous or
even under the majority recommenda-
tion of the committee for the Common-
wealth Fund.30 Any ground of unavail-
ability would suffice, and even the good
faith of the declarant would go only to
probative value and not to admissibil-
ity. This last point is particularly im-
gation is more than a stately and traditional
game played to induce a desirable frame of
mind in the eventually unsuccessful suitor.3 9 Morgan et al, op. cit. supra, note 7, at
c. IV. It should of course be noted that the
recommendations of Professor Morgan's Com-
mittee were designed at least to include, and
perhaps primarily for, jury trials.
1940]
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portant in cases in which it might be
helpful to use statements of unidenti-
fied persons; for example, there might
be situations not covered by the com-
mon law precedents in which commu-
nity reputation would be of aid. Here
specific findings of good faith could
hardly be used.
Another situation in which the "best
evidence" principle, by analogy, would
lead to the use of evidence inadmissible
both at common law and under the rec-
ommendations of the Commonwealth
Fund Committee was recently sug-
gested by Chairman Madden of the
N.L.R.B.4 0 It may often happen that
definite proof or disproof of some fact
in issue is in the control of one party,
but the burden at least of coming for-
ward with evidence is upon the other.
In such a case the party having the
burden should be allowed the most free
use of hearsay. This approach would
give a shortcut past many difficult prob-
lems of admissions by agents, particu-
larly in suits involving large corpora-
tions.4 1
Still another useful result of treat-
ing hearsay as a special case of second-
ary evidence would be the increased
use of what is known as "past recollec-
tion recorded." Under existing law, rec-
ords of past events made even by pres-
ently available witnesses can be used
only to a limited extent unless the wit-
ness be willing to swear that on looking
40 Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools (1939) 178.
41 In addition, this analogy may aid in the
general treatment of admissions under the
hearsay rule.
42Semble, Den ex dem Weatherhead v.
Baskerville, 52 U. S. 329 (11 How. 1850).
43 Where the maker of the record was un-
at the memorandum his recollection of
the past event is refreshed. By analogy
to the use of copies to aid in reading
mutilated or partly obliterated docu-
ments,J 2 such memoranda or records
should be directly available as evidence
after full examination of the man who
made them discloses that his recollec-
tion has become incomplete.41
Of course, it is not urged herein that
hearsay should always be admitted.
Where it is of virtually no value and
merely consumes time, where it raises
unduly long and difficult collateral is-
sues, where it is unfair because highly
prejudicial or because it is impossible
to meet it by other evidence, in such
cases it should be excluded, as other
evidence should be excluded in like
cases. But it should not be excluded
merely because it is hearsay except
where the party offering it could by
reasonable effort and without depend-
ing on sources controlled by the oppo-
site party have offered instead the de-
clarant as a witness in his proper per-
son.
IV.
The foregoing discussion has dealt
exclusively with admissibility. The
problem of the minimum quantum of
evidence necessary to sustain a burden
'of proof on each ultimate issue has been
avoided. In the opinion of the writer
this is a problem for the trier of fact 4
available, of course the memorandum could be
used.
44 In jury cases, the problem in the first
instance is for the judge to determine whether
reasonable men could be convinced by the evi-
dence, and later for the jury to deter'mine
whether it is convinced. In other than jury
trials this initial division of function does not
occur. However, in all cases the question arises
on appeal, if not before, whether a finding of
fact is supported by evidence.
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after the record has been closed. Any
attempt to anticipate this question of
adequate probative force in ruling on
the admissibility of an offer of evidence
(except in determining whether the
value of the proffered evidence justi-
fies the time to be consumed in hear-
ing it) can only lead to confusion and
often to wrong decision.
On the other hand, once the question
of admissibility has been passed upon
it should be dismissed from considera-
tion, leaving no echo to confuse the
subsequent evaluation of probative
force. To put it mildly, there is not a
perfect correlation between the com-
mon law exclusionary rules and the
probative value of evidence, and an at-
tempt to weigh evidence in terms of its
legal value, or any similar concept, can
only confuse. To take a particular ex-
ample, in Eastlick v. Southern Railway
Company45 a widow brought her action
against the railway for the negligent
killing of her husband. Plaintiff's wit-
nesses, on cross-examination, recited
what the defendant's locomotive engi-
neer said immediately after the wreck.
No objection was made to this evidence,
and if the recitals were true the de-
fendant was guilty of no negligence.
The trial court non-suited plaintiff, but
was reversed, the Georgia Supreme
Court saying in part:
"There can be no question that the
plaintiff, but for the testimony with
respect to these declarations of the
engineer, would have been entitled to
go before the jury; for the evidence as
to the cause of her husband's death, in
connection with the legal presumption
of negligence against the company, was
sufficient to make out in her behalf a
45116 Ga. 48, 42 S. E. 499 (1902).
prima facie case. Ought she to have
been denied the privilege of having the
jury pass upon the case merely because
of the introduction of the hearsay tes-
timony above pointed out? We think
not. Such testimony, save as to well
defined exceptions, is inadmissible for
any purpose, because it is wholly with-
out probative value. The fact that it is
admitted can not give it any such value.
In other words, testimony of this char-
acter which does not come within any
of the exceptions just referred to is, in
legal contemplation, wholly worthless,
and has been so regarded and treated
through all the ages of the English law.
While a party who permits hearsay tes-
timony to be introduced without objec-
tion, or who has himself introduced
such testimony, will not be heard to
complain of the fact that it went to the
jury, and must suffer whatever disad-
vantage may come of their giving it
sufficient weight to turn the scale
against him when there is enough legal
testimony before them to support a
finding in favor of his adversary, it will
not do to say that such a finding, rest-
ing upon hearsay testimony alone, can
lawfully stand merely because the
losing party did not object to such tes-
timony when offered by his adversary,
or himself introduced the same. No
plaintiff should ever, under any circum-
stances, lose his case when there is
evidence to warrant a recovery by him,
and the verdict or judgment in favor
of the opposite party has nothing upon
which to rest but inadmissible hearsay
testimony."
It should especially be noted that the
court does not say that all hearsay not
covered by one of the "well-defined"
exceptions is really worthless, but that
such testimony is in legal contemplation
wholly worthless. This apparently
means that even after evidence has
been admitted without objection the
court must pass upon its worth in terms
of the rule of law which would have
1940]
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applied if objection had been made
rather than in terms of the actual ap-
parent value of the particular offer in
view of the circumstances of the par-
ticular case. The court is applying an
irrebuttable presumption of the coin-
cidence between admissibility at com-
mon law and probative value.
Such a decision is bad enough on ap-
peal from common law trial. In the
much criticized case of Matter of Car-
roll v. Knickerbocker Ice Company0
the New York Court of Appeals took
the same stand on an appeal from the
workmen's compensation commission,
which by statute was "not bound by
common law or statutory rules of evi-
dence" and might "make such investi-
gation or inquiry or conduct such hear-
ing in such manner as to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties." The
award appealed from was on one essen-
tial point sustained only by recitals
made by the injured workman immedi-
ately before his death. After reciting
the controlling statute the majority
opinion for the court said: 47
"This section has plainly changed the
rule of evidence in all cases affected by
the act. It gives the workmen's com-
pensation commission free rein in mak-
ing its investigations and in conducting,
its hearings and authorizes it to receive
and consider not only hearsay testi-
mony, but any kind of evidence that
may throw light on a claim pending
before it. The award of the commission
cannot be overturned on account of any
alleged error in receiving evidence.
"This is all true, but, as I read it,
section 68 as applied to this case does
not make the hearsay testimony offered
by the claimant sufficient ground to
uphold the award which the commission
made. That section does not declare the
46 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
probative force of any evidence, but it
does declare that the aim and end of
the investigation by the commission
shall be "to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties." No matter what
latitude the commission may give to its
inquiry, it must result in a determina-
tion of the substantial rights of the
parties. Otherwise the statute becomes
grossly unjust and a means of oppres-
sion.
"The act may be taken to mean that
while the commission's inquiry is not
limited by the common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by technical or
formal rules of procedure, and it may in
its discretion accept any evidence that
is offered; still in the end there must
be a residuum of legal evidence to sup-
port the claim before an award can be
made. As was said by Justice Wood-
ward in his able dissenting opinion at
the Appellate Division: "There must be
in the record some evidence of a sound,
competent and recognizedy probative
character to sustain the findings and
award made, else 'the findings and
award must in fairness be set aside by
(the) court." (Italics supplied.)
Such a decision goes little beyond
the rule generally applied to non-jury
trials, that on a record containing both
competent and incompetent testimony,
the decision will be presumed to
have been based on the competent.
Here as in the Georgia case the court,
while ruling that the mere admission
of evidence incompetent at common
law constitutes no basis for reversal,
still assumed the common law rules of
admissibility to be conclusive determi-
nants of the probative value of the
evidence received. Slight familiarity
with the decisions dealing with "dying
declarations," with "statements of phys-
cal condition" and with "spontaneous
exclamations" is sufficient for appreci-
47 Id., at 440.
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ation of the naivete of this assumption
in the very case presented.
Although the rule of the Knicker-
bocker case has been most effectively
criticized,48 a disturbing tendency to
give it at least lip service may be ob-
served even among those administrators
who might be expected to oppose it
most strongly. Thus Chairman Madden
of the Labor Board in a recent ad-
dress49 has said, "It will readily be ac-
knowledged that most hearsay testi-
mony has little or no probative value,"
going on to justify its admission chiefly
to develop leads toward competent evi-
dence and suggesting that it may be
worthy of independent reliance in but
one somewhat unusual situation. While
Chairman Madden's remarks are easily
understandable in light of criticisms
which have been directed at the Labor
Board, it may be that in the long run
a more aggressive position might prove
wiser. Administrative tribunals have
48 Wigmore, Evidence, §4 b (B) 5.
but recently attained the importance in
practical affairs which they hold today.
It still remains for them to prove to
many observers their utility and fair-
ness. And if they must eschew a vio-
lent break with the judicial tradition
to avoid the charge of injustice, they
must also show enough freedom from
arbitrary rules inherited from the past
to substantiate their claims of effi-
ciency. One way to the latter end will
lie in a careful evaluation of existing
rules of evidence to determine their
underlying policy (where one exists),
the extent to which that policy is ap-
plicable to the administrative tech-
nique, and above all, the extent to
which that policy is in fact carried out
by the formal rules of the litigeous
game as it exists today. For only by a
judicious declaration of independence
from precedent can these quasi-
tribunals justify their existence.
49 Supra, note 40.
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